with a very brief outline of the dialogue's structure:
The dialogue begins with an introduction that sees Ctesippus and Hippothales enticing Socrates into a wrestling-school where he is to show Hippothales the proper way of talking to Lysis, the one dear to him. Following this introduction the dialogue concerns three main discussions separated by significant reactions from the participants. The first conversation involves Lysis (his young friend Menexenus has been called away) and Socrates. During the course of the discussion Socrates humbles and checks Lysis, "instead of puffing him up and pampering," showing Lysis where his true value lies and demonstrating to Hippothales how he should proceed.
When Menexenus returns Lysis wants him to receive the same treatment from Socrates, and thus the second conversation is between Menexenus and Socrates and concerns the quest for a "friend". 7 They pursue a line of inquiry that leads them to conclude that it is not the lover who is the friend, but the loved, just as it is the hated who is an enemy, not the hater.' This leads them, ultimately, to the further conclusion that a man is often a friend to one who is no friend, or an enemy to one who is no enemy, but even a friend. At this point Menexenus is lost and Socrates suggests that they may have been conducting their search improperly.
Socrates involves both boys in the final conversation. The discussion moves to the question of desire and the notion of friends belonging to one another. But if those that belong are alike then, by virtue of a previous conclusion, they cannot be friends, a paradox which the dialogue seems unconcerned to delve, and a situation which, to Socrates' mind, makes them appear ridiculous: they consider themselves friends, but cannot say what a friend is.
II
The reader who examines the arguments in depth will understand that problems confront anyone who expects a stated resolution to the dialogue's inquiry, and, as noted above, scholars in general have found little in the Lysis to warrant much positive attention. 9 Some, in discussing the early dialogues, even dismiss it with no more than a passing lament for the confusion and inconclusiveness., Those who do pay it some discussion often tend towards one of two camps, the first dwelling on the failures and discussing reasons for them, and the second finding the dialogue's only justification in its association with, or preparation for, the more satisfying arguments of the Symposium and the Phaedrus. 10 Clearly, if we are to defend the Lysis we must show how it contributes an internally consistent thesis to the Platonic corpus.
More recently attempts have been made to develop more positive interpretations of this dialogue. Gadamer suggests that the negative conclusions of the 'traditional' approach arise because the scholars involved have neglected the principle of the Doric harmony between logos and ergon.
11 This is to propose that the ergon is lost in the concern over the logos, that the failure of the traditional approach lies in the emphasis on sophistry and interpretation while the encounter with the man is overlooked.
In focussing on the deeds that underlie the words one is immediately impressed by the degrees of friendship actually exhibited within the dialogue. This is stressed by Friedlander in his discussion of the Lysis. ' 2 The two boys are shown as friends in the natural sense before the philosophical discussion begins. Above this is the somewhat higher sense of friendship seen in the love of Hippothales for Lysis and Ctesippus for Menexenus. Finally, the highest sense of friendship is seen in the service of paideria (education, 'philosophical enlightenment') displayed by Socrates towards all four dialogue participants." Thus when various degrees of friendship are discussed within the dialogue they are appreciated by the participants in accordance with their experience. For example, "when the notion of congeniality is applied to the love between human beings, Menexenus asserts, whereas Lysis remains silent. This shows the difference in their experience."
14 Also, according to Friedlander, when these degrees of friendship are mentioned the reader understands how they are represented in the dialogue, such that at the end the reader is well aware that the "pretended" lover is exemplified in Hippothales, while the "genuine" lover is shown in the figure of Socrates. In this way Friedlander ultimately proceeds to add his voice to those who recognize the Lysis as a precursor of the Symposium: the eras which concerns the later dialogue is clearly behind thephilia of the Lysis.
There is much to be said for Friedlander's thesis of 'exhibited' friendship, and it certainly presents the dialogue in a more positive light. My contention is only that he has not gone far enough.
Like Friedlander Gadamer emphasizes the friendship that exists between Menexenus and Lysis at the beginning, but he does so by stressing that their friendship is simply that which is characteristic of children. "Friendship for them is that naive comradeship of boasting and outdoing one another in which children warm up to each other."" When Lysis bursts in on Menexenus' confusion (213D) agreeing with Socrates that their train of thought was misconceived, Gadamer sees Lysis not only involved in the dialogue but undergoing a change of awareness.
Not only does his own childish understanding of friendship, which is based upon the sameness of friends, resist these sophistic distinctions which Socrates has been making. It seems that as a consequence of his being so disquieted by these sophistries, something of a premonition comes to him that real friendship might be an entirely different, tension-laden thing." This tension-laden relationship is expressed by the word oikeion (that which pertains to the household). Gadamer wants it understood in the limited sense of where one feels at home and belongs, because friendship consists in the fact that a person finds his self-awareness, his self-confidence, through the other, and not that he merely wishes to forget himself and his needs in the other.
It is important to note that for Gadamer Lysis has the premonition but not the apprehension. Thus when Socrates brings the converstion to the apparent truth that those who love belong to each other such that the lover must be befriended by his favourite, Hippothales, the unlucky lover, concurs passionately while Lysis falls silent not liking the result. "The logos here has not yet revealed something in deed (ergot) to this boy, whose experience still lags behind what Socrates has been saying." 17 One must know what friendship is in order to distinguish it in what has been said, and it is this that the boys do not yet know.
So Gadamer concludes that the boys end in ignorance. They do not know because children could not know, but their "not-knowing" has all the positive promise of Socratic ignorance, the false knowledge has been cleared, the way is prepared for the soul to see. Gadamer, then, gives the Lysis one of its most positive treatments yet. But, again, I would wish to press further, to suggest an apprehension on the part of Lysis, revealed through his responses in the dialogue. Ill The existence of friendship in the Lysis is best seen in two explicit moments. In looking at the dialogue one understands that there may be more meaning expressed than the words themselves can carry. In Gadamer's terms there is the ergon beyond the logos, in the light of which the words themselves can take on a new meaning. From this perspective nothing included in the dialogue might be irrelevant to its decoding.
Socrates is detained outside a wrestling-school into which he is ultimately drawn. One is struck immediately by the backdrop of physical struggle and fierce competitiveness against which the dialogue ensues. We see the discussion of friendship rise and fall within an environment that knows the daily effort of men and boys bettering themselves by overcoming and being overcome.
The reason for Socrates' presence there is to show Hippothales the proper way to speak to his beloved. But while many commentators see this and the initial conversation with Lysis as no more than an excuse to set up the "real" examination of friendship, this is not the case. It plays a necessary and integral part in the whole; just as Menexenus' being called away before the discussion can really begin is also necessary. While it might be suggested that Menexenus was only there to draw the more timid Lysis into dialogue with Socrates, the point is that the same end could have been achieved with Menexenus remaining there. He leaves so that something can happen to Lysis alone. And he leaves, to state the obvious, so that he might come back.
Concerning Menexenus' return A.E. Taylor notes: "Some by-play follows here, and when the argument is resumed it is with a different interlocutor. This is a device for calling our attention to the fact that the main issues of the dialogue have not been raised." 18 No, the main issue has been raised, the by-play involves probably the key, and certainly the first, moment in the dialogue. When Menexenus returns Lysis asks Socrates to repeat to Menexenus what he had said to him. Socrates has just finished humbling Lysis, methodically de-constructing his ego so that the reconstruction would be truer, showing him exactly where his real value lay. This was done in order to show Hippothales how one should speak to one's beloved. Here in Hippothales we do indeed, as Friedlander suggested, witness the false friend. Hippothales' dominant characteristic is a disharmony of words and deeds, he praises Lysis in order that the glory should be reflected back onto him by association. Now, at the moment when it is clear that Hippothales is not a friend, Lysis requests Socrates to treat Menexenus as he had treated him.
It is here that the first crucial moment arises (211 C). When Socrates questions the motives of Lysis, asking if he wishes to see revenge in watching Menexenus triumph, he replies no, that he wants Socrates to trounce Menexenus, to put him down (kolazein -to chastise). In other words, he wanted Menexenus to experience what he had just experienced because he realized its value. This is no childish putting down of a friend, this is the moment when Lysis catches his first understanding of the friendship and enacts it. 19 Highly competitive in appearance, this friendship places the friend in a position where he can be humbled or excel, and be better for it. Lysis sits back and, without warning his friend, allows Menexenus to become engaged in a conversation that Lysis himself can see, through the avid attention he is paying, is misconceived. It is not until Menexenus confesses that he is lost, and Socrates suggests why, that Lysis interjects. He blushes because the words had escaped him unintentionally. Socrates notes that he had been closely applying himself to their talk, and had possibly forseen the problems into which Menexenus was being led. But he remained silent. Now, is his outburst of excitement an expression of pleasure at seeing Menexenus' defeat? A kind of gloating through which Lysis benefits? Or is Lysis' excitement prompted by seeing his friend fail for his own sake? And, further, is this to be construed as friendship? I suggest that it is. Presumably, since they confess to be friends, Menexenus' failure will reflect upon Lysis as well. Of course Hippothales would never have permitted something like that to occur, and this fact serves to emphasize the difference between the two attitudes.
As the dialogue proceeds first Lysis and then Menexenus are drawn into a further discussion. The boys agree or express doubts or misunderstandings, mostly in unison. But then Socrates suggests that someone desiring another would never desire him or befriend him if he did not belong to his beloved in some way. At this point (222 A), while Menexenus responds in the affirmative, Lysis is silent. Here is the second moment that reveals friendship in action. The silence here, sigae, has the added sense of 'keeping secret', and this ambiguity suggests a deeper meaning, that Lysis might have spoken but kept silent. Because of course, if Lysis does not want to concede this point why does he not state it? I would suggest that he sees exactly what is coming, understands the undesirability of the conclusions that will follow, but remains silent deliberately. He sees the argument does not work but rather than telling Menexenus this he 'keeps secret', allowing him to discover it for himself. His silence is a painful silence. While Gadamer suggests that the logos "has not yet revealed something in deed (ergoi) to this boy," the opposite seems the case -the silence of Lysis is a deed, it is the act of not intervening in what is happening to Menexenus. Lysis stops and allows Menexenus to follow into Socrates' conclusion without any restraining words, words which under other circumstances would seem to indicate friendship. But the friendship of Lysis allows the other (the loved) to fall or excel, forces him into that situation of trial, because it understands the result to be the betterment of the other.
Friendship when it speaks, the first moment, does so that both might learn. And when it is silent, the second moment, it is again to allow a learning experience. There seems a definite harmony of words and deeds in Lysis' character. He professes friendship in his request that Menexenus might be put down, and in his silence in the face of his friend's downfall.
Interestingly, Roger Duncan, in examining the notion of philia in the Gorgias, concludes for some reason that the desire for friendship is as natural as the desire to outdo others. 20 As we have seen, they are indeed remarkably similar, but how paradoxical this appears without the vivid example of the Lysis, where what appears to be the outdoing of another is illustrated as a deep love and friendship for that other.
Socrates draws out of these boys not only a sincere attempt to understand their friendship, but also the enactment of friendship. The deeds are juxtaposed against the words which so often hide them. We have a succinct expression of Socratic irony here, the irony which bridges the gap between the ignorance of words and the knowledge of existence. This irony expresses the tension between ignorance, the inability to voice what friendship is, and the direct experience of the unknown, the existence of "the friend". To describe in words alone what friendship is would be to falsify it in some way, to prevent the necessary moment of encounter in the discovery of the idea. Because one cannot capture in a definition this living reality. So the characters 'speak' friendship beneath the definitional failure of the dialogue. No serious man, says Plato in the Seventh Letter, will write about serious realities for the general public. Unless a man has an affinity for what he's seeking he won't see it anyway, and to describe it to him is to misdirect him, to suggest that he can chase after it in words.
Perhaps this is why Socrates accords so much attention to definitions, to logos. What have been seen as defective arguments within a perplexing context emphasize the inadequacy of definition without an underlying experience. Those who attend to the logic alone in an attempt to explain the dialogue share with the initial interlocutors the same risk of being misled. And the type of problem that can arise from such an attempt has already been noted (note 8).
So, the importance of the dialogue's ending is not diminished but seen in a positive light. They cannot say what friendship is, but this is not to conclude that the dialogue has failed. Clearly, they will always be unable to say what it is, since it will always be something that cannot be 'said'. One is reminded here of Euthyphro's confusion, All' o Sokrates, ouk echo egoge, opos soi eipo ho noo, and his concern that the definitions they put forward in search of 'piety' continue to encircle them (Euthyphro 11B). The best we can do is attempt to point to it (friendship, piety, etc.), to demonstrate it by example. Although no conclusion has been reached, we know them to be friends through the use of the concrete situation to illustrate the discussion.
While there are still a number of points regarding this dialogue that could be pursued (for example, the continuing discussion of the relationship of philia to eras), I hope to have shown that it does indeed present, in the way it is composed, a full-fledged concept of friendship.
In concluding I should acknowledge the relevance of the Lysis to our situation. Friedlander suggests that for Plato "there was no philosophy without friendship or love". Socrates is a friend who presents the other with the opportunity to excel, the occasion to learn. The view of friendship extolled here is inextricably wedded with learning. One acts for the sake of the other's betterment; friends wrestle, throw and are thrown on a sphere above the physical. Socrates de-constructs to present the possibility of a learning process in the reconstruction.
Beyond this, the Lysis emphasizes that friendship and philosophy are inseparable. While the metaphor of the wrestling-school has a physical connotation, it is in the arena of the intellect that this friendship really appears valuable. The solitary thinker is the anti-thesis of what is described here. The quest for knowledge is a co-operative venture. We force those whom we take as friends into learning situations with the expectation that they will reciprocate. Truth, if it is found anywhere, is to be found in the dialogue of our lives, and not in the words that at their best can only express the periphery of the dialogue.
Christopher W. Tindale, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1. Notes *An earlier version of this paper was read at Wilfrid Laurier University in March, 1982. This paper arose from my many conversations on Plato with Jose Huertas-Jourda. I have further benefited from his helpful comments on the final draft. 2. No real digression is needed to explain this concept of friendship prevalent in the behaviour of the Greeks. Guthrie provides more than an adequate discussion of this in his history (noted above), explaining that love between males was perfectly natural in Athens and not a topic of embarrassment. It was believed that in male attachments, usually younger with older, lay the potential for heroism and virtue, and the possibility of a lasting, spiritual relationship. In Plato this relationship is best seen in the interchange between Socrates and Alcibiades in the Symposium. Socrates believes that by his love he will inspire Alcibiades to live a richer life, and this in turn gives Plato the opportunity to emphasize the possibility of true eras over the lower falsehood of homosexual love.
The Lysis takes place against the backdrop of such understandings, both Athenian and Platonic. Viewed from these perspectives the existence of friendship acquires no small importance. The State sees this institution (which promotes courage and virtue) as being essential for its survival. While for Plato friendship is seen as an integral part of the education of the just man.
